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Validation of New Technology Using Legacy Metrics: Examination of




This study demonstrated an innovative method of utilizing expert raters and actual high-risk incidents to identify shortcomings of using
legacy metrics to measure the effectiveness of new technology designed to mitigate hazardous incidents. Expert raters were used to
validate the Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA) model for providing
alerts to pilots to reduce the occurrence of pilot deviation type runway incursion incidents categorized as serious (Category A or B) by the
legacy FAA/ICAO Runway Incursion Severity Classification (RISC) model. The study concluded that the SURF-IA model did not yield
an outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for all pilot deviation type runway incursion incidents classified as serious by the FAA/ICAO
RISC model. The different outcomes between the RISC and SURF-IA models may result in misleading information when using the
reduction in serious runway incursion incidents as a metric for the benefit of SURF-IA technology.
Keywords: runway incursion, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, Runway Incursion Severity Classification, Enhanced Traffic Situational
Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts
Introduction
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) forecasts that airport tower operations associated with increased domestic
capacity will increase by 23% between FY 2012 and FY 2032, which corresponds to an increased number of runway
operations (FAA, 2011a). As a proactive measure for mitigating runway incursions, which have continued to increase both
in rate and in number, the FAA is introducing various technologies as part of the Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen). NextGen is a series of interlinked programs, systems, and policies that implement advanced technologies
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and capabilities to dramatically change the way the current
aviation system is operated. One of those technologies will be
Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport
Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA), which alerts
pilots of potentially dangerous runway incursions (FAA,
2011b).
Runway incursions are defined as the incorrect presence
of an aircraft on a surface designated for takeoff and landing,
and are grouped into three types: (a) operational error/
deviation/incident (OE/D/I), (b) vehicle-pedestrian deviation
(V/PD), and (c) pilot deviation (PD) (FAA, 2009; ICAO,
2007).The proposed metric to measure the benefit of SURF-
IA as a runway incursion mitigation strategy will be assessed
by the FAA Office of Runway Safety through analysis of
statistics for change in the rate of pilot deviation (PD) type
runway incursions using the legacy Runway Incursion
Severity Calculator criteria (ADS-B, 2011). However,
different outcome severities from the RISC and SURF-IA
models, when applied to the same runway incursion incident,
may result in misleading information when using the
reduction in runway incursion incidents classified as serious
by the RISC model as the metric for assessing the
effectiveness and benefit of new SURF-IA technology.
The outcome differences may also result in a pilot not
receiving a Warning, or Caution alert, from the SURF-IA
flight deck technology for an event that would be categorized
and reportable to the FAA by the RISC model as a serious
runway incursion.
This paper was adapted from a study by Joslin (2013)
that examined the use of legacy metrics from the RISC
model to assess the effectiveness and benefits of the SURF-
IA model for providing alerts to pilots to reduce the
occurrence of PD type serious (Category A or B) runway
incursion incidents. Category A is defined as a serious
incident in which a collision was narrowly avoided while
Category B is defined as an incident in which separation
decreases and there is significant potential for a collision,
which may result in time critical corrective/evasive re-
sponse to avoid a collision. Category A and Category B are
considered serious incidents (FAA, 2010a).
SURF-IA Model
The SURF-IA model was developed by the Radio
Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) and
published as Safety, Performance and Interoperability
Requirements Document for Enhanced Traffic Situational
Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and
Alerts (SURF-IA)-RTCA/DO-323 (RTCA, 2010). Using
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
technology, SURF-IA mitigates runway incursions by
enhancing pilot situation awareness of other aircraft
through a Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI).
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast is the FAA’s
satellite-based successor to radar. ADS-B makes use of
Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to determine
and share precise aircraft location information, and streams
additional flight information to the flight deck of properly
equipped aircraft (FAA, 2012a). The CDTI is enhanced
with SURF-IA visual alerts, aural alerts, and indications
that highlight traffic and runway status through alphanu-
meric information and symbology (Figure 1) (Jones &
Prinzel, 2006; Jones, Prinzel, Otero, & Barker, 2009; Jones
et al., 2010; RTCA, 2010). The SURF-IA logic defined
conflicts as any movement between two aircraft that
potentially could lead to a high speed collision on the
runway surface. The conflict prediction was based on the
relative speed and track between the two aircraft unless
own-ship was on the surface and the conflicting traffic
was airborne on approach, or when own-ship was airborne
on approach and the conflicting traffic was intruding on
the runway. In both of the latter cases, which involved
one aircraft on the surface and one airborne aircraft, the
alert logic was based on predicted time for the airborne
aircraft on approach to reach the runway threshold
(RTHRE). A Caution alert was issued if the predicted
time to conflict was less than 35 seconds. A Warning alert
was issued if the predicted time to conflict was less than
15 seconds (RTCA, 2010). SURF-IA also provided
Runway Status Indications (RSI) and Traffic Indications
Figure 1. Conceptual cockpit display of a Warning alert from SURF-IA.
Adapted from ‘‘Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements
Document for Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport
Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA),’’ by Radio Technical
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA/DO-323).
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(TI) for traffic in normal operational conditions, consist-
ing only of runway and/or traffic highlighting on a CDTI
with no aural annunciations. The RSI and TI indications
were intended to remind the pilot to verify runway status
prior to proceeding and to increase the flight crews’
situational awareness about particular relevant traffic that
could affect runway safety, but did not require any time-
critical or immediate action.
Runway Incursion Severity Classification Model
The FAA Office of Runway Safety tracks and classifies
runway incursions, and uses a Runway Incursion Severity
Classification model as part of its quality management
system (QMS) to validate runway incursion severity
classifications (FAA, 2006; FAA, 2011a; FAA, 2011b). A
computer program, which automated the RISC model, was
developed by the FAA and VOLPE National Transportation
System Center with the aim of standardizing assessments of
runway incursion events among the FAA and ICAOmember
states (ICAO, 2007). The Runway Incursion Severity
Classification calculator classifies the outcome of runway
incursions into one of three severity categories: ‘‘A’’, ‘‘B’’, or
‘‘C.’’ Category D runway incursions are considered non-
conflicting. The primary factors considered in the RISC
model were horizontal/vertical proximity of the aircraft and/
or vehicle/pedestrian, geometry of the encounter, evasive or
corrective action, available reaction time, environmental
conditions, and factors that affected system performance
such as communication failures/errors (Figure 2).
The International Civil Aviation Organization (2007)
also formalized the use of the Runway Incursion Severity
Classification computer program for modeling and stan-
dardizing the classification of outcomes from runway
incursions to provide consistent ratings by applying the
same decision processes used by expert FAA raters. ICAO
asserted that, ‘‘such consistency is deemed essential for
being able to examine trends over time or see the effects of
mitigation strategies’’ (ICAO, 2007, p. H-1).
RISC and SURF-IA Model Comparison
The RISC model was based primarily on aircraft state,
environmental factors, and non-temporal quantitative factors
for closest horizontal or vertical (overflight) proximity and
could consider air traffic controller (ATC) intervention. The
SURF-IA model for alerts relied on GPS derived quantita-
tive aircraft state factors that considered horizontal and
vertical proximity as well as temporal closure considera-
tions. However, the proximity information entered into the
RISC model from ATC deviation reports at times was based
on subjective observations of incidents with regard to how
close two aircraft came to colliding, rather than the precise
GPS derived instrument readings for position and time that
Figure 2. Runway Incursion Severity Classification calculator. Adapted from the ‘‘Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions,’’ by ICAO, 2007.
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were used in SURF-IA (GAO, 2007). An overview of the
primary model factors is provided in Table 1.
Other comparisons between SURF-IA alerting model and
the RISC model for a serious (Category A or Category B)
classification that could affect the outcomes were as follows:
1) SURF-IA model will alert when conflicting aircraft is
within 35 seconds of the runway threshold (RTHRE);
the RISC model is distance based, not time based.
2) Even when a take-off clearance was cancelled by
ATC, SURF-IA will alert when conflicting traffic
was on the same runway with either aircraft moving
at greater than 40 knots with closure. The RISC
model accounted for air traffic controller instructions
and interventions.
3) SURF-IA will alert for any conflicting traffic
operating below 1000 feet above the airfield elevation
(AFE) with horizontal and/or vertical closure, while
the RISC model for a serious incident typically
requires less than 4000 feet horizontal separation or
less than 100 feet vertical overflight separation.
4) The SURF-IA model defined an on-runway condition
for an aircraft not lined up with the runway as any part
of the aircraft inside the runway shoulder. The SURF-
IA model also considered an aircraft to have met the
on-runway condition when it was approximately
lined-up with the runway and was within one runway
width of the runway centerline (Figure 3). However,
the FAA (2010a) Runway Safety Program and the
RISC model defined an on-runway condition to be
when any part of the aircraft was inside the runway
hold position markings (i.e., hold line). A comparative
depiction of the on-runway condition for the SURF-IA
model and RISC model is provided in Figure 4 (FAA,
1989, 2010a; RTCA, 2010).
By definition, a runway incursion incident classified as
serious (Category A or B) required an immediate or time
Table 1
Comparison of primary model factors for RISC and SURF-IA
Factors for Model FAA RISC Model SURF-IA Alerts Model
Horizontal Separation ! !
Vertical Separation ! !
Aircraft Geometry ! !
Runway Visual Range ! 6
Ceiling/Visibility ! 6
Braking Condition ! 6
Closure Rate 6 !
Day/Night ! 6
VMC/IMC ! 6
Aircraft Size ! 6
Aircraft Maneuver ! !
Human Errors ! 6
ATC Intervention ! 6
On-Runway Criteria Hold Short Line Runway Shoulder
Distance from Runway ,1 mile from runway threshold #35 seconds to runway threshold
! Considered 6 Not considered.
Note: Adapted from ‘‘Safety, performance and interoperability requirements document for enhanced traffic situational awareness on the airport surface with
indications and alerts (SURF-IA),’’ by Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), 2010, and ‘‘A method for rating the severity of runway
incursions,’’ by Cardosi, et al., Proceedings of the USA/Europe 6th Air Traffic Management Research and Development Seminar, 2005.
Figure 3. SURF-IA on-runway conditions. Adapted from ‘‘Safety, performance and interoperability requirements document for enhanced traffic situational
awareness on the airport surface with indications and alerts (SURF-IA),’’ by RTCA, 2010.
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critical response by the pilot in either aircraft, which is
analogous to SURF-IA alerts (Warning or Caution) that
also require a similar pilot response. The model for SURF-
IA used the 14CFR 125.1322 definition of an alert,
modified to only consider Warnings and Cautions and not
Advisories (FAA, 2010b; RTCA, 2010). Hence, a serious
(Category A or Category B) runway incursion outcome
from the RISC model was equivalent, in terms of outcome
severity, to a SURF-IA potential alert outcome.
Previous SURF-IA Research
The literature review indicated that previous research,
simulations, and demonstrations of SURF-IA had all
followed the accepted practice of benchmarking performance
of conflict alerting algorithms using generic conflict scenario
profiles, and not data from specific actual runway incursion
incidents (Latimer, 2012). Latimer’s (2012) research on
creating a conceptual detection and avoidance model
recognized the value of using actual incidents to examine
outcomes of conflict alerting models and even presented a
mix of generic scenarios and actual incidents; however, the
study ultimately only utilized the generic scenarios. An
analysis by Moertl, Lascara, Higgins, and Baker (2012) to
estimate the safety benefits of SURF-IA based on the
minimum RTCA (2010) SURF-IA requirement utilized data
from a set of 24 historical Category A and Category B
runway incursions from FY 2007 of which 12 were PD type.
The runway incursions were reconstructed from limited
available information, and required detailed assumptions
about aircraft movement and timing based on aircraft typical
performance characteristics, such as aircraft velocity and
distance travelled down the runway during take-off/landing,
and aircraft speed and altitude during an approach to a
landing. The study considered both indications and alerts,
and used three raters who assessed the effect of SURF-IA on
reducing the severity of runway incursion incidents (i.e.,
Category A to Category B or Category B to Category C);
however, no measures of inter-rater reliability were presented
and the study utilized the FAA definition of runway incursion
prior to it being harmonized with ICAO in 2008. Moertl et al.
(2012) concluded that only 33% of the pilot deviation type
incidents would have provided either a SURF-IA alert or
indication. Lascara and Moertl (2012) subsequently devel-
oped a software tool called the Surface Surveillance Analysis
Platform (SSAP) to determine, verify, and validate SURF-IA
outputs from historic runway incursions; however, SSAP
used outputs different than required by minimally compliant
RTCA (2010) SURF-IA technology.
Methodology
Video reenactments of nine runway incursion incidents
and the associated incident report data from the Aviation
Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system
were reviewed by two expert raters. The ASIAS system is
an online resource developed by the FAA that enables users
to perform integrated queries across multiple databases,
search an extensive warehouse of safety data, and display
pertinent elements in an array of useful formats. The raters
applied the baseline minimally compliant implementation
of the RTCA/DO-323 SURF-IA model to determine which
incidents would have triggered a SURF-IA Warning or
Caution alert. The runway incursion incidents were rated
on a dichotomous scale that classified the incidents as
either SURF-IA alerting or SURF-IA non-alerting. The
Figure 4. U.S. airport surface geometry on-runway points. Adapted from ‘‘Safety, performance and interoperability requirements document for enhanced
traffic situational awareness on the airport surface with indications and alerts (SURF-IA),’’ by RTCA, 2010, ‘‘Runway Safety Program,’’ by FAA, 2010a,
and‘‘Airport Design,’’ by FAA, 1989.
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analysis focused on whether runway incursion incidents
classified with an outcome as serious (Category A or B)
using the RISC model would trigger a SURF-IA model
outcome to display an alert (Warning or Caution) to the pilot.
The minimum requirements for the SURF-IA alerting model
were applied to each incident using the definitions and logic
from RTCA/DO-323 (RTCA, 2010). The study did not
consider or evaluate the physical location of the SURF-IA
annunciation on the CDTI in the pilot’s field-of-view,
navigational positional accuracy, or aircraft deceleration/
braking performance. Hence, the raters only rated whether or
not a SURF-IA alert would have been triggered, without
considering if a runway incursion would have been avoided.
Sources of the Data
The data were derived from two archival sources: (a)
ASIAS reports, and (b) FAA runway incursion video
reenactments. ASIAS reports of actual runway incursion
incidents were already classified as serious (Category A or
B) by the FAA Office of Runway Safety by applying the
legacy Runway Incursion Severity Classification model.
These data, posted on the ASIAS on-line database, were
extracted and matched with the video reenactments of the
incidents that were produced by the FAA Office of Runway
Safety, which are periodically posted on the FAA Office of
Runway Safety website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/
runway_safety/videos/). The FAA video reenactments were
developed through precise surveillance data from Airport
Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) and
the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System
(PDARS), along with the narrative information from the
ASIAS runway incursion reports. The FAA Office of
Runway Safety produced reenactment videos of runway
incursion incidents that were of high interest to the public,
FAA, or the NTSB (R. Motzko, personal communication,
July 11, 2012). The database consisted of 58 video
reenactments from runway incursion incidents of all types
and categories that occurred between CY 2005-CY 2012,
of which nine were PD type serious (Category A or B)
incidents. The sample set consisted of the entire population
of serious pilot deviation type runway incursion incidents
recorded by the FAA Office of Runway Safety in the
ASIAS database, for which video reenactments were
produced using actual surveillance data from the incidents.
Results
There was 100% agreement between the two raters for the
outcomes from the SURF-IA model for the pilot deviation
type runway incursion incidents categorized as serious
(Category A or B) by the RISC model. Both raters agreed
that 66.7% of the serious incidents would have a SURF-IA
outcome of an alert, and 33.3% would not have alerted
(Table 2, Table 3). The free-form comments provided
insight into the explanation for the aircraft states for the
serious incidents that did not provide a SURF-IA alert
outcome. The factors that precluded a SURF-IA outcome of
a Warning or Caution alert were: (a) SURF-IA model did
not alert for a single aircraft wrong runway departure; (b)
SURF-IA model did not alert for helicopter runway
incursions; and (c) SURF-IA model did not alert for own-
ship entering or crossing the runway and being overflown by
another aircraft taking off on the same runway when the
aircraft on take-off had already lifted off prior to own-ship
entering the runway. All of the aforementioned factors that
precluded a SURF-IA outcome of a Warning or Caution
alert would have been rated as serious by the RISC model
for the incidents analyzed. A common theme in the raters’
qualitative comments was the lack of clear or harmonized
definitions for the aircraft states used in the models for the
SURF-IA technology and the legacy RISC metrics that were
used to validate the benefit of the new technology. The
aircraft state definition mentioned by the raters as being
most troublesome was on-runway.
This study revealed the lack of correspondence between
the outcomes from the RISC and SURF-IA models.
Expressly, the study revealed that the SURF-IA model
did not yield an outcome of a Warning or Caution alert
for all runway incursion incidents classified as serious
Table 2
Own-ship/Traffic pairs from serious (Category A or B) runway incursion incidents assessed by the expert raters as having an alerting SURF-IA outcome
Own-ship Aircraft State
Entering/Crossing




(#3 nm from Runway)
Stopped or Taxiing on









Runway (Not Lined Up)
ASIAS ID 8173





(#3 nm from Runway)
ASIAS ID 4828
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(Category A or B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model. There
were specific aircraft states in the baseline SURF-IA
model that precluded an outcome of a Warning or Caution
alert for runway incursion incidents classified as serious
(Category A or Category B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC
model.
Wrong Runway Departures
A wrong runway departure involving a single aircraft is
classified as a serious runway incursion by the RISC model
if there is a subsequent loss of separation from another
aircraft, otherwise they are classified as Category D;
however, the SURF-IA model only provides alerts for
incidents involving two aircraft. Hence, all runway
incursion incidents from wrong runway departures, even
if the aircraft were SURF-IA equipped, would reflect as an
increase in rate and number of runway incursions. The
potentially misleading statistical analysis of the benefit of
SURF-IA for runway incursion data when not designed to
alert for wrong runway departures classified as serious by
the RISC model, was estimated by looking at historical
data for the number of wrong runway departures. An
FAA (2007) report on U.S. domestic wrong runway
departures indicated that from CY 1981-CY 2006 there
were 696 incidents or accidents involving wrong runway
operations. These data were collected prior to the FAA
adopting the ICAO definition of runway incursions that
added wrong runway departures. From FY 2008-FY
2013 (January), under the expanded definition of runway
incursion, the ASIAS database recorded 23 wrong runway
incidents. All of the aforementioned runway incursions,
which involved single aircraft wrong runway departures
with a subsequent loss of separation from another aircraft,
would have been classified by the RISC model as serious.
However, none would have resulted in a SURF-IA alerting
outcome because the SURF-IA model does not provide
alerts for incidents involving one aircraft. Hence, these
wrong runway departure incidents would have been
interpreted as missed alerts from SURF-IA technology.
Validating Legacy Metrics for New Technology
This study developed a step-by-step methodology that
filled the gap for assessing the validity of legacy/traditional
metrics for application to new technology (Table 4).
Conclusions
The study revealed that the SURF-IA model did not
yield an outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for all
runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category
A or B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model. There were
specific aircraft states in the baseline SURF-IA model that
precluded an outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for
runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category
A or Category B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model: (a)
wrong runway departures, with a subsequent loss of
separation with another aircraft, (b) traffic entering the
runway after own-ship lift-off from same runway, and (c)
helicopter operations that cross runways at other than
established taxiways. The baseline version of SURF-IA
was not intended for installation on helicopters; however,
an add-on safety analysis may be able to show that
helicopters could safely operate SURF-IA (RTCA, 2010).
In FY 2012 there were 10 serious (Category A or B)
pilot deviation type runway incursions, which was a tenfold
increase over the one (1) runway incursion of this type and
category reported in FY 2011. This study used four of the
ten incidents recorded in FY 2012, of which three were
rated as non-alerting by the SURF-IA model. If this study
had assumed that all aircraft involved in the FY 2012
incidents had SURF-IA equipment installed, and then used
the change in PD type runway incursions classified as
serious by the RISC model as a metric to assess the
effectiveness and benefit of SURF-IA, at least three of the
ten FY 2012 incidents would not have provided a SURF-IA
alert. Hence, the FY 2012 runway incident data would have
been misleading by indicating that the SURF-IA model was
at best only 70% effective and beneficial in providing an
alert to mitigate the hazard from runway incursion
incidents classified as serious by the legacy RISC model
metric. The aforementioned different outcome severities
from the RISC and SURF-IA models may result in
misleading information when using the reduction in serious
runway incursion incidents, classified by the RISC model,
as a metric for the benefit of SURF-IA technology.
This study demonstrated an innovative method of utiliz-
ing expert raters and actual high-risk incidents to identify
the shortcomings of using legacy metrics to measure
the effectiveness of new technology designed to mitigate
hazardous incidents. The expansion of the methodology
used in this study to other areas lies in first identifying the
Table 3
Own-ship/Traffic pairs from serious (Category A or B) runway incursion incidents assessed by the expert raters as not having an alerting SURF-
IA outcome
ASIAS ID Own-ship State Traffic State Factor
10923 Entering/crossing runway (not lined up) Take-off from same runway Traffic lifted off prior to own-ship entering the runway
10675 Entering/crossing runway (not lined up) After landing roll-out on runway Own-ship was a helicopter
10969 Take-off ,80 knots Not applicable Single aircraft wrong runway departure
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known limitations and capabilities in the actual design of any
new technology and then using expert raters to see if, and
how, the outcomes from legacy metrics were affected. If the
model differences yield outcomes that do not match, the
design of the new technology and/or the design of the metric
for measuring the benefit of the new technology may need
adjustment. The overall implication from this study is
that the implementation of new technology demands a
concurrent validation of the metrics used to assess its
effectiveness. The methodology is generalizable and can be
applied to other high-risk areas, such as medicine, nuclear
power plants, and other modes of transportation.
Recommendations
Prior to the certification of SURF-IA for use on aircraft, it
is recommended that further study with a larger number of
runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A
or B) by the RISC model is conducted to identify other
aircraft states and associated factors that do not trigger a
SURF-IA alerting outcome. It is also recommended that
prior to using the ASIAS runway incursion data as a metric
for the benefit of SURF-IA, the FAA develop a process for
identifying and tracking ASIAS reported serious runway
incursion incidents which are known not to trigger an
alerting outcome in the baseline SURF-IA. Data from the
runway incursion incidents involving runway aircraft states
not designed to trigger an alert by the baseline SURF-IA
model should not be considered when assessing the effe-
ctiveness and benefit of the new SURF-IA technology for re-
ducing runway incursion incidents. However, consideration
should be made to harmonize the technology (SURF-IA) and
the metric (RISC) used to assess its effectiveness by either
improving the SURF-IA model technical capabilities to
accommodate all possible aircraft states that the RISC
model would classify as serious (Category A or B) runway
incursion incidents, or modifying the RISC model to match
SURF-IA criteria.
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